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Abstract 
Recent advances in the development of compact microprocessors have brought forth new 
applications in the field of data acquisition and wireless communication.  One of these 
applications is a compact sensor mote that has the ability to perform both data acquisition 
and transmission within a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN).  Wireless sensor 
communication is susceptible to the same data security threats as traditional wireless 
networks.  In an environment where sensors are broadcasting battlefield intelligence or 
patient biometrics, data confidentiality must be enforced utilizing some form of 
encryption.   
Unlike traditional wireless networks, where the communicating devices have 
unrestricted access to power and memory, a wireless sensor has very limited resources.  
A wireless sensor consists of a battery designed to last an extended amount of time, 
therefore it is critical that the computation and transmission overhead involved in 
enforcing data security be optimized to preserve battery life. 
The research presented in this thesis details a nesC/TinyOS implementation of the 
NTRUEncrypt PKCS executing on a Crossbow MICAz mote.  Algorithm details 
regarding message encryption and decryption are analyzed along with optimization 
techniques that improve execution time and reduce memory size.  A summary of 
performance metrics including execution time, power consumption and code size relative 
to the comparable ECIES-160 PKCS is also provided.   
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1 Introduction 
Security within a network, either wired or wireless, typically involves the use of 
cryptography.  Cryptography is the process that allows for secure communication over 
insecure channels [1].  A channel is a transport mechanism that facilitates the exchange 
of information from one location to another using a physical wire or through the air.  In 
order for two parties to communicate securely, they must utilize a mathematically 
common element, know as a key, to transform and thereby disguise messages being 
transmitted be each other.  The transformation of an intelligible message, called plaintext, 
into an unintelligible form, called ciphertext, is called encryption.  The reverse process of 
converting the ciphertext back into a usable plaintext form is known as decryption.  
Whether the key is kept secret among the communicating parties, or a subset of the key is 
publically shared, defines the type of cryptosystem.   
1.1 Private Key Cryptography 
A cryptosystem in which the key is ‘shared’ and kept private between the communicating 
parties is known as a symmetric, or private key, cryptosystem.  Since the key is used in 
both the encryption and decryption process, it must remain private otherwise the security 
between the two parties will be compromised.  As long as a secure channel exists within 
the private key cryptosystem, private keys can be easily updated on a regular cadence to 
prevent an adversary from studying the cryptosystem and determining the private key [1].   
1.2 Public Key Cryptography 
Public key, or asymmetric cryptosystems are an evolutionary improvement over its 
private key counterpart.  Introduced in 1976 by Diffie and Hellman [41], at the time when 
computer networking was at its infancy, Diffie and Hellman realized a need to establish 
secure communication over an insecure channel, i.e. a network connection.   Unlike 
private key cryptosystem where the private key is shared between the communicating 
parties, public key cryptosystems do not share a common key.  A party interested in 
establishing a secure conversation, obtains each others public keys, without the need of a 
private channel.  The distribution of public keys can be done publically, without the 
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means of a secure channel, thereby allowing anyone to communicate securely to the 
owner of the public key.     
Though public key cryptosystems (PKCS) allow for quick and easy setup, their 
key size, number of bits, are typically larger than those of a private key cryptosystem of 
equivalent security level [46].  The public key cryptosystem, RSA [3] whose name was 
derived from the authors’ initials, has a 1024-bit public key version with an equivalent 
symmetric security level of only 80-bits [47].  
Since the PKCS keys are larger and more complex to create, the amount of 
computation power required for encryption and decryption is significantly greater than 
that of a private key cryptosystem.   Figure 1.1 provides a high level overview of the 
process involved in sending an unsecure plaintext message from a sender, the conversion 
into an encrypted ciphertext, to the final decryption back to plaintext form that a recipient 
can understand.  This is a one way function starting at the sender and ending at the 
receiver, therefore in order for a message to return back to the sender, the sender would 
have to provide their own public key to the receiver and the whole process would run in 
reverse.   
 
Cipher Text
Encryption
Algorithm
Decryption
Algorithm
Plain Text Plain Text
Sender Receiver
Receiver’s Private KeyReceiver’s Public Key
 
Figure 1.1: Public Key Encryption and Decryption 
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Advantages of Public Key Cryptosystems in Key Distribution 
The small key size and low computational complexity of private key cryptosystems allow 
for fast execution times and low memory usage, but the inherent design of the 
cryptosystem does not facilitate updating the private key used between the two 
communicating parties.   
 Key distribution schemes allow for the secure deployment, or replacement, of the 
private keys being utilized in a cryptographic system.   Secure distribution of these keys 
between the interested parties typically falls into one of three schemes: Key Distribution 
Center Scheme, Key Pre-distribution Scheme and Public Key Scheme [29]. 
The Key Distribution Center Scheme utilizes a central server in which each node 
interested in communicating on the network must access in order to obtain a private key.  
In a wireless environment, where nodes are placed in remote areas that rely on message 
hopping, access to a central server is not an option. 
The Key Pre-distribution Scheme involves embedding keys within each node 
prior to deployment [29].  This can be a universal key or multiple keys stored within each 
sensor.  The universal key, though not requiring much memory space, would easily 
compromise the security of the network if an adversary were to capture the node and 
obtain the common network key.  Having each node contain multiple keys, a unique key 
pair per node, reduces the probably of an adversary determining the correct ‘active’ key, 
however, storing multiple keys per node increases memory size.  In a wireless sensor 
network, such as a battle field, where node counts could be substantial, storing unique 
keys for per node communication is impractical [18]. 
 Lastly, the public key scheme eliminates the issues involved with the 
aforementioned schemes [29].   Due to the asymmetric property of PKCS, sensor nodes 
do not need to contain any pre-distributed keys.  The advantage of a public key 
cryptosystem over a private key cryptosystem is there are no private transactions required 
prior to establishing secure communication [3].   Not having to establish a private 
transaction means wireless sensors can be deployed at will and secure communication 
can be established immediately.  If a sensor is compromised as a result of an adversary, 
new public keys can be easily distributed. 
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1.3 Security on Resource Constrained Devices 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) applications range from sensors collecting battle field 
intelligence, to the monitoring of patient vitals such as heart rate and blood pressure.  
Transmission of confidential data, such as sensitive medical information must be 
protected from fraudulent activities such as alterations to treatment procedures or drug 
dosages [5]. 
 Wireless devices within a WSN typically have limited resources including battery 
life, memory size and processing power.  Maximizing battery life is extremely important 
in environments where sensors are deployed only once and never serviced again.  Though 
transmission and reception of information usually requires the most energy in a WSN 
[34], the extra processing cycles imposed by an encryption scheme can actually consume 
more power than communication [9].  Every effort should be directed towards 
optimization of the cryptosystem code to reduce power consumption.  
 Data security in resource constrained devices, such as wireless sensors, has 
traditionally been solved using private key cryptosystems such as MiniSec [6] and 
TinySec [7].  These private-key based cryptosystems are popular due to their low energy 
consumption and fast execution times, but sacrifice security.  An alternative cryptosystem 
that provides enhanced security at the expense of increased computational complexity is 
the asymmetric, or public key, cryptosystem. 
 While PKCS appear to be superior in regards to network compromises from an 
adversary, they do have some deficiencies.  Several publications argue that a PKCS, 
though secure, are not realistic for use in wireless nodes due to their excessive 
computational overhead [29][30].  An excellent example is the famous RSA PKCS [3].  It 
is extremely secure, but is not a viable option for resource constrained devices due to its 
high computational requirements [19].  The Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) standard 
is an alternative PKCS well suited for resource constrained devices that offers the 
equivalent security to RSA, but with faster execution times and reduced memory size.    
ECC [11] is based on the difficulty of the Discrete Logarithm Problem, but on an elliptic 
curve. Given two points P and Q, it’s believed computationally infeasible to find a 
number k such that Q = kP, see [13].     
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 NTRUEncrypt is a relatively new PKCS that suggests faster execution times and 
requires less memory, for an equivalent security level, than ECC and RSA [24].  
Conceived in 1996, NTRUEncrypt is a latticed based PCKS that features short, easily 
created keys with fast execution times and low memory requirements [2].   
1.4 Related Work 
Challa et al work comparing NTRUEncrypt to RSA clearly shows NTRUEncrypt to have 
significant performance gains over RSA [16].  Investigation into research benchmarking 
NTRUEncrypt, to the very comparable ECC cryptosystem, is close to non existent. The 
closest example by Driessen et al [15], provides an excellent comparison between the 
NTRUEncrypt based key signature algorithm, NTRUSign, and the comparable ECC 
equivalent Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). Driessen et al research 
supported their statement of “NTRUSign is superior to the other signature schemes when 
comparing signature generation and verification time” [15].  Much of the performance 
gains of NTRUSign were from use of trinary polynomials and Karatsuba [40] variants to 
obtain a 9x performance increase over ECDSA [15]. 
A different approach, by Buchmann et al [14], that enhances the performance of 
NTRUEncrypt’s fundamental operation of polynomial multiplication, involves finding bit 
patterns within polynomials [14].  By identifying repeating bit patterns, the number of 
additions required to compute the product of two polynomials can be reduced, thereby 
lowering execution time.       
1.5 Thesis Objectives 
This thesis focuses on the details involved in the software implementation of 
NTRUEncrypt on a resource constrained device including the comparison of 
NTRUEncrypt performance metrics relative to the equivalent ECC version referred to as 
Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES).  Since ECIES is an accepted 
standard under IEEE 1363-2000 [42], much research detailing implementation 
optimizations along with execution times on various hardware platforms has been 
published [12][13][17].  Though the details of ECIES will not be discussed, an overview 
of ECC will be provided for completeness.  The intent of this thesis is to provide an in 
   6
depth understanding of the steps involved in the implementation of NTRUEncrypt and 
how its performance relates to ECIES.   
 The rationale to compare NTRUEncrypt with ECIES was based on several 
publications by Challa et al [16] and Wang et al [5] that showed ECC based PKCS to 
have greater performance than that of RSA [3].  Since ECC based PKCS are very popular 
in the resource constrained embedded microprocessor market, comparing ECIES to 
NTRUEncrypt on a resource constrained device was chosen.   
1.6 Organization 
The remainder of this thesis provides an overview of elliptic curves in Section 2 
including the theory involved in the ECIES PKCS.  Section 3 introduces NTRUEncrypt 
and provides a detailed explanation, including examples, of how to implement 
NTRUEncrypt.  Section 4 provides data obtained from an actual implementation of both 
NTRUEncrypt and ECIES on a wireless sensor, including execution time, RAM and 
ROM size, and power consumption.  Software implementation details, along with 
Karatsuba optimization techniques used by other researchers, of NTRUEncrypt are 
discussed.  Section 5 concludes this thesis by providing a summary of findings along with 
suggestions for future work.      
2 Elliptic Curves 
2.1 Elliptic Curve Groups over Real Numbers 
An elliptic curve is a smooth graph that does not contain any self-intersecting points 
along its curve.  Elliptic curves can be used to define a group given the following form 
with a, b, x and y all being real numbers [8]. 
 
 baxxy ++= 32  (1) 
 
The shape of an elliptic curve is controlled by the value selection of variables a and b.  
For an elliptic curve to be valid for use in cryptography, the curve must not contain any 
repeated factors and therefore must satisfy the following equation. 
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 0274 23 ≠+ ba   (2) 
 
Over a number field, a cubic, i.e. a polynomial of degree three, can have at most three 
roots, where a root is defined as a point where the curve crosses the x-axis.  For real 
numbers, the roots of a cubic fall into two categories, degenerate and non-degenerate.  A 
degenerate case occurs if any two roots of the cubic coincide with one another, such as 
the case where the two curve cross at the x-y intersection as shown in Figure 2.1 below: 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Degenerate Curve 
The following examples cover several non-degenerate curve applications.  
2.2 Point Addition for Points with Different x-Coordinates 
The addition of two points on an elliptic curve can be represented both mathematically, 
as well as, graphically.  The addition of two points, F and G, for points with different x-
coordinates, is performed by drawing a straight line through points F and G until the line 
intersects the curve at a third point –H, because the slope of such line is finite.  The next 
step is to take the reflection of point –H across the x-axis to obtain H.  The resultant H is 
the summation of F and G, see [8]. 
 
(x)
(y)
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Figure 2.2: Elliptic Curve Point Addition When F ≠ -G 
2.3 Point Addition for Points with the Same x-Coordinates 
In this case, the previous point addition technique is invalid.  The drawing of a line 
through these two points results in a vertical line intersecting only two points on the 
elliptic curve, instead of three.  In this case, the elliptic curve group defines a third, 
infinity point O, with the two points having additive inverses, see [8]. 
 
 Given: 
F = (xF + yF), G = (xG + yG) 
 
Find (Addition of F and G): 
H = F + G 
 
Solve: 
)(
)(
GF
GF
xx
yys −
−=  
GFH xxsx −−= 2  
FGFH yxxsy −−= )(  
 
Answer: 
),( HH yxH =  
F
G
-H
H
(x)
(y)
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Figure 2.3: Elliptic Curve Point Addition when F = -F 
 
2.4 Point Doubling (F + F = 2F, Fy ≠ 0) 
Doubling of a point involves adding a point to itself.  The process involves drawing a line 
through point F, tangent to the elliptic curve.  The line will intersect a second point, -H, 
on the elliptic curve if Fy ≠ 0.  The reflection of point -H across the x-axis results in the 
product point H, see [8].   
Note: If Fy = 0, then the result of doubling F is the infinity point O, see [8]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Given: 
F = (xF + yF), G = -F = -(xF + yF) 
 
Find (Addition of F and -F): 
H = F + (-F) 
 
Answer: 
H = F + (-F) = O 
-F
F
(x)
(y)
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Figure 2.4: Elliptic Curve Point Doubling when F + F = 2F, Fy ≠ 0 
2.5 Point Doubling (F + F = 2F, Fy = 0) 
When attempting to double a point where the y-coordinate = 0, i.e. Fy = 0, the tangent 
line to the elliptic curve will never intersect a second point on the curve.  The tangent line 
to the elliptic curve is actually vertical and results in the product, 2F, equaling the infinity 
point O, see [8]. In this example, there are three possible points for F where Fy = 0. 
 Given: 
F = (xF + yF) 
 
Find (2F): 
H = 2F = F + F 
 
Solve: 
)2(
)3( 2
F
F
y
axs +=   
Note: a represents one of the domain 
parameters for the elliptic curve. 
 
HH xsx 2
2 −=  
)( HFFH xxsyy −+−=  
 
Answer: 
),( HH yxH =  
-H
H
(x)
(y)
F
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Figure 2.5: Elliptic Curve Point Doubling when F + F = 2F, Fy = 0 
2.6 Point Multiplication 
Point multiplication on an elliptic curve utilizes a scalar parameter k multiplied by a point 
F on the elliptic curve, such that kF = H.  Using the previous techniques of point addition 
and doubling, point multiplication is possible.  The following example illustrates the 
technique [8]. 
 
Given k = 17 and point F, find H = kF. 
 
H = kF = 17F = 2(2(2(2F)))) + F 
 
Note: If Fy = 0 for point F, the following substitutions are made in the above equation 
based on the point doubling equation, Figure 2.5, when Fy = 0. 
 
Given 2F = O, then 2F + F = 3F = F.  Continuation of this pattern reveals: 
 
H = kF = 4F = 3F + F = O, 5F = 4F + F = F,….etc 
 
In summary, if scalar k is even, H = O, otherwise H = F. 
 Given: 
F = (xF + yF) 
 
Find (2F): 
H = 2F = F + F 
 
Answer: 
H = 2F = O, since Fy = O H3 (x)
(y)
H1 H2
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2.7 Elliptic curves Groups Over Fp 
Cryptographic use of elliptic curves requires a finite field Fp instead of real numbers.  
Extending the definition of the elliptic curve from real numbers to a finite field of 
integers restricts the field size to p values through the use of modulo arithmetic.  For an 
elliptic curve, E(Fp) all computations in Fp are reduced modulo p, therefore an elliptic 
curve containing non negative integer variables a, b, x and y can be defined as follows 
[32]: 
 
 )(mod32 pbaxxy ++≡   (3) 
 
Just as with elliptic curves over real numbers must not contain repeated factors, elliptic 
curves over a finite field Fp must also maintain this property.  
 
 0)(mod274 23 ≠+ pba   (4) 
 
Elliptic curves, Fp, consist of a finite number of points thereby making them suitable for 
cryptosystems.  In order to utilize a Fp for cryptography, equation (4) must be satisfied 
for randomly selected values of a, b, and p.   
The following illustrates this step given randomly chosen variables a = 4, b = 3 
and p = 5: 
)(mod32 pbaxxy ++≡  
)5(mod3432 ++≡ xxy  
Selecting point (2, 4): 
)5(mod3)2(52)5(mod4 32 ++≡  
)5(mod3108)5(mod16 ++≡  
11 ≡  
Since point (2, 4) satisfies the equation, it is a valid point on the elliptic curve F5 and can 
be used for cryptography. 
The graphical representation presented in the last section is not feasible for an 
elliptic curve with a finite number of points.  The point addition and doubling techniques 
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are the same except a reduction modulo p is performed [8].  There is a point addition and 
point doubling algorithm described as follows.   
2.8  Point Addition  Point Doubling 
 
Figure 2.6: Elliptic curve Point Addition for Fp 
3 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) was introduced by Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller in 
1985 [33] and is an accepted standard by IEEE under 1363-2000 & 1363a-2004 with 
security based on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem [8].  ECC 
utilizes a finite group composed of points (x, y) located on an elliptic curve with the 
encryption and decryption process based on the aforementioned point addition and 
multiplication. 
3.1 Key Generation 
ECC key generation starts by selecting a finite field elliptic curve E(Fp) based on 
Equation (3).  Given an elliptic curve E over a finite field Fp, let G be a point that has a 
 Given: 
F = (xF + yF), G = (xG + yG) 
 
Find (Addition of F and G): 
H = F + G 
 
Solve: 
)(
)(
GF
GF
xx
yy
s −
−= )(mod p  
GFH xxsx −−= 2 )(mod p  
FGFH yxxsy −−= )( )(mod p  
 
Answer: 
),( HH yxH =  
Given: 
F = (xF + yF) 
 
Find (2F): 
H = 2F = F + F 
 
Solve: 
)2(
)3( 2
F
F
y
axs +=  )(mod p  
Note: a represents one of the domain 
parameters for the elliptic curve. 
 
HH xsx 2
2 −= )(mod p  
)( HFFH xxsyy −+−= )(mod p  
 
Answer: 
),( HH yxH =  
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prime order n within E(Fp).  These values can be used to generate cyclic subgroup E(Fp), 
see [33]: 
 
{G} = {∞, G, 2G,…(n-1)G} 
 
3.1.1 Private Key(s) 
The private key is an integer k that is selected at random from the interval [1, n-1]. 
3.1.2 Public Key 
The public key, Q, is the private key k, multiplied by a random point H selected from the 
elliptic curve.   
 Q = kH (5) 
3.2 Encryption 
Encryption in ECC starts with the desired plaintext message to send, m.  The message, m, 
is converted into a point, M, in the finite field Fp and is encrypted by adding it to a 
randomly selected integer k multiplied by the recipient’s public key Q, such that: 
 
 E1 = M + kQ (6) 
 
In addition to E1, the sender also calculates E2 by multiplying the previously selected k 
with the random point H, such that: 
 
 E2 = kH (7) 
 
The sender then transmits both point E1 and E2 to the recipient [33].  In order for the 
recipient to decode the ciphertext points, the two communicating parties must agree on a 
set of domain parameters, T,  that are exchanged up front.  The parameters contain a list 
of 6 items that relate the ciphertext to the original plaintext.  The domain parameters are: 
 
T = (p, a, b, G, n, h) 
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Where: 
 p – Size of field F 
 a – First value defining curve 
 b – Second value defining curve 
 G – Initial base point on curve 
 n – Order of point G 
 h - Cofactor 
3.3 Decryption 
To recover the original message, m, the recipient first must find point M on the elliptic 
curve given the following equation: 
 
 M = E1 – kQ (8) 
 
Utilizing the domain parameters, p, E, H and n, the following substitutions are performed 
[33]. 
 
 kQ = k(dG) = d(kG) = d(E2) (9) 
 
Substitution of variables from (9) into (8) results in the following decryption equation for 
point M. 
 M = E1 – d(E2) (10) 
 
Since the domain parameters are public, the recipient can reconstruct the elliptic curve 
and locate the original message, m, given point M. 
4 NTRUEncrypt Implementation 
NTRUEncrypt was implemented in nesC and timing data was collected for each step of 
the cryptosystem including key generation, encryption and decryption execution times.  
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NesC [28] is a variant of the C Programming Language that is optimized to run on 
resource constrained devices.   
 Pseudo-code representing the actual nesC code developed in this thesis are 
represented as ‘Algorithms’ throughout the rest of this thesis unless otherwise noted. 
4.1 Background 
NTRUEncrypt, also known as the NTRU encryption algorithm, is a new PKCS relative to 
other cryptosystems and was just recently adopted into the IEEE P1363.1™/D12 [22] 
draft standard for PKCS in February of 2009.  NTRUEncrypt was proposed by Hoffstein, 
Pipher and Silverman in 1996 and is based on ring theory [2]. Security of the 
cryptosystem relies on the difficulty of finding extremely short vectors within a lattice.  It 
was developed in an effort to provide an efficient public key cryptosystem that required 
less system resources such as memory and CPU processing power, while still maintaining 
similar security to that of other PKCS.   While the exact translation for the acronym 
NTRU is not exactly known, several rumored translations include “Number Theorists 
aRe Us” [1] and “N-Th Degree Truncated Polynomial Ring”.    
NTRUEncrypt is based on a ‘Ring of Truncated Polynomials’ represented by ring 
R below:  
 
 
)1(
][
−= NX
XZR  (11) 
 
The polynomials within the ring, R, consist of all truncated polynomials of degree N-1 
having integer coefficients [31]. 
 
 ( ) 112211001
0
... −−
−
=
+++=∈= ∑ NNiN
i
i XaXaXaXaRXaXa  (12) 
 
The NTRU algorithm involves the addition and convolution multiplication of 
polynomials within R, see [31].  Addition of polynomials, denoted by the symbol ‘⊕ ’, is 
performed as follows utilizing traditional polynomial addition. 
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Since the resultant of any polynomial manipulation must remain within R, convolution 
multiplication of polynomials, or ‘star multiplication’, denoted by the symbol ‘⊗ ’, is 
performed the traditional way with the exception that the exponents must never exceed N.  
Constraining the polynomial to size N is accomplished by reducing and rotating 
exponents (i mod N). 
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Constraining the polynomials to size N has an added benefit when implementing NTRU 
in software and/or hardware.  Unlike traditional multiplication where two N sized 
polynomials multiplied together could potentially expand to 2N -1 in size, star 
multiplication limits the size to N, thereby requiring less memory. 
The fundamentals of NTRUEncrypt are based on parameters N, p, and q.  As 
mentioned above, N represents the number of degrees of the polynomial ring R.  The 
parameters p and q represent the modulus values used throughout the encryption and 
decryption process.  Both of these modulus values must maintain the following properties 
[2]. 
 
- The gcd(p, q) = 1, i.e. p and q must be relatively prime 
- The value of q must be considerably larger than p 
 
Utilizing this ring of polynomials and reducing modulo p and q, encryption and 
decryption can be performed [2]. 
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4.2 Modulo Arithmetic 
Modulo arithmetic is a fundamental reduction operation used in many steps of the 
NTRUEncrypt algorithm.  Modulo reduction, referred to as ‘mod’, is the remainder value 
produced by the division of two numbers [44].   
Given: a = 23, b = 7 
Find: c = 23 mod 7 
 
23
7
23 remainder=  
23 mod 7 = 2 
The general expression for modulo is: 
 
a mod b 
 
The concept of congruence can be also defined using modulo: 
 
a ≡ c(mod b) 
 
With congruency, given a constant b, the value c remains the same regardless of the value 
chosen for a.  The following two values of 23 and 30 are considered congruent to each 
other. 
 
23 ≡ 2(mod 7) 
 
30 ≡ 2(mod 7) 
 
If a and b have no common factors between them, then it is possible to find an inverse for 
a(mod b), such that [44]: 
a * c ≡ 1 (mod b) 
 
Find the inverse of 2(mod 7): 
11 * 2 ≡ 1 (mod 7) 
 
The inverse of 2(mod 7) = 11 since 11 * 2 = 22 ≡ 1 (mod 7).  The Extended Euclidean 
algorithm [22] may be used to find the inverse of any number [44]. 
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4.2.1 Modulo of Negative Numbers 
Modulo is defined as the difference between the largest integer multiple of the divisor 
that is less than the dividend.   Modulo reduction of a positive number is straightforward: 
 
23 mod 7 = 2 
 
Modulo reduction of a negative number can be difficult to comprehend: 
 
-23 mod 7 = 5 
 
The confusion begins with the natural tendency to divide and transfer the ‘sign’ to the 
quotient.  For the example of -23 mod 7, the largest integer divisor less than the dividend 
is -28, not -23.  The number line in Figure 4.1 represents the graphical representation for 
both -23 mod 7 and 23 mod 7.    
 
 
Figure 4.1: Number line representing positive and negative modulo 
Understanding the concept of negative modulo is extremely important in the 
implementation of NTRUEncrypt since the private key polynomials contain negative 
coefficients.  The incorrect usage of modulo reduction for negative numbers will result in 
unexpected polynomial coefficients throughout the NTRUEncrypt algorithm. 
The modulo operator ‘%’ in nesC, as well as other programming languages, 
simply transfers the ‘sign’ value of the dividend to the quotient, thereby resulting in an 
incorrect solution.  As a result, a custom modulo function detailed in Algorithm 4.1, 
written in nesC, was used to correct this issue. 
 
0 10 20 30-30 -20 -10
2321
2 = 23 mod 7
-23-28
5 = -23 mod 7  
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Minor optimizations to prevent the modulo ‘%’ operation from occurring on values equal 
to zero or less than the ‘modVal’ where added in steps 1 and 3 of Algorithm 4.2.1.   
4.3 Key Generation 
Key generation in NTRU, just like all asymmetric cryptosystems, creates a private and 
public key pair.  Generation of the private and public keys in NTRU begins with the 
selection of two polynomials f and g within ring R with coefficients being small relative 
to the large modulus q.  Selection of the two polynomials f and g are constrained to the 
following criteria: 
 
- Polynomial f must be invertible modulus of both p and q.  More 
specifically [2]: 
 
 
)(mod1
)(mod1
pff
qff
p
q
≡⊗
≡⊗
 (15) 
 
- Polynomial f must contain df  number of coefficients equal to ‘+1’, df -1 
number of coefficients equal to ‘-1’ and the remaining N-2df -1 
coefficients equal to ‘0’. 
Input:  value – Input to apply modulo 
 modValue – Modulo value to apply  
 
Output: Modulo reduced value 
   
Init: retVal = value 
 
1: If ( value = 0 ) 
2:  Return 0 
3: If ( retVal + modVal <= 0 OR retVal – modVal >= 0) 
4:  retVal = value % modVal 
5: If ( retVal < 0 ) 
6:  retVal = retVal + modval 
7: Return retVal 
Algorithm 4.1: Mod(value, modValue) 
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- Polynomial g must contain dg number of coefficients equal to ‘+1’, dg 
number of coefficients equal to ‘-1’ and the remaining N-2dg coefficients 
equal to ‘0’. 
- To ensure security, generation of both polynomials f and g, need to be 
random generated by means of a Random Number Generator (RNG) or 
Index Generation Function (IGF) detailed in [22]. 
 
Note: The reason df contains an unequal number of  ‘+1’ and ‘-1’, is due to the constraint 
of f to be invertible, since a polynomial f(1) = 0 can never be inverted.  Polynomial g does 
not need to be invertible and therefore has an equal number of ‘+1’s to ‘-1’s [2]. 
Creation of the random polynomials used throughout the NTRUEncrypt PCKS 
must be generated in an unbiased manner to prevent an adversary from predicting future 
sequences.  Section 9.2.1 of the P1363.1 draft standard details the requirements for 
generating random polynomials using either an index generation function (IGF) or a 
random number generator capable of producing unbiased outputs.  For the purpose of this 
thesis, Algorithm 4.2 was written based on a random number generator.  Since the 
MICAz mote contains a rolling counter that is set to zero upon reset, generating a truly 
random number given a constant seed was not feasible, though it was very useful for 
producing predicable outputs for debugging purposes.  Implementation on a device that 
maintains time across resets would resolve this issue.   
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Since the only requirement to generate a random polynomial is an input count for the 
number of ‘+1’ and ‘-1’, Algorithm 4.2 loops through an n sized polynomial, inserting 
num_ones count of ‘+1’ or num_neg_ones count of ‘-1’ at random positions. 
4.3.1 Private Key(s) 
NTRUEncrypt requires the generation and storage of two private keys, f and fp.  The 
generation of the private key polynomial f utilizes Algorithm 4.2 with df number of ‘+1’ 
and (df -1) number of ‘-1’.  
The second private polynomial key, fp, is the inverse calculation of f modulo p (f 
mod p).  Calculation of this inverse, in the ring of truncated polynomials R, is performed 
using either the Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA) [22] or the Almost Inverse 
Input:  n – Nth degree size of polynomial 
num_ones – Number of coefficients equal to ‘+1’ 
num_neg_ones – Number of coefficients equal to ‘-1’ 
  
Output: a(x) = Polynomial with random coefficients equal to -1, 0, or +1 
   
Init: pos = 0 
 
1: While ( num_ones OR num_neg_ones ) 
 { 
2: rVal = RandomNumberGenerator 
3: pos = rVal % n 
4: if (num_ones AND a(pos) = 0) 
 { 
5:  a(pos) = 1; 
6: num_ones = num_ones - 1 
 } 
 
7: rVal = RandomNumberGenerator 
8: pos = rVal % n 
9: if (num_neg_ones AND a(pos) = 0) 
 { 
10:  a(pos) = -1 
11: num_neg_ones = num_neg_ones - 1 
 } 
 } 
Algorithm 4.2: GenerateRandomPolynomial(a(x), n, num_ones, num_neg_ones) 
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Algorithm (AIA) [19].  Wilhelm’s investigation into the performance of both algorithms 
suggests the AIA to have better performance and therefore was utilized in this thesis [23].   
4.3.2 Almost Inverse Algorithm 
By definition, a polynomial b is invertible, modulo p, if the resultant inverted polynomial 
B maintains the following property [31]. 
 
 )1(mod)(mod1 −=⊗ NxpBb  (16) 
 
The work in presented by Silverman et al [20] presents two AIA implementations, one 
for modulo p = 2 and another for modulo p = 3.  The combined AIA, Algorithm 4.3, was 
written to support both modulo reductions thereby reducing code space.  The specific 
changes required to add p = 2 support to the base p = 3 algorithm are shown as bolded 
steps throughout Algorithm 4.3.  
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Input:  a(x) – Polynomial to invert 
n – Nth degree size of polynomial 
c – Modulo value to apply to coefficients 
  
Output: b(x) ≡ a(x)-1 – Inverse polynomial of a(x) in (Z/cZ)[x] / xn – 1; NoInverse; or  
ERROR 
   
Init: k = 0, b(x) = 1, c(x) = 0, f(x) = a(x), g(x) = xn – 1 
Error Check:  If (c != 2 OR c != 3) 
   Return ERROR 
 
1: Loop:  
    { 
2: While ( f(0) = 0 AND NumDegrees( f(x) != 0 ) ) 
 { 
3:  f(x) = 
x
xf )(  
4:  c(x) = c(x)⊗ x 
5:  k = k + 1 
 } 
6a: If ( NumDegrees( f(x) ) = 0 ) 
 { 
6b:  If ( f(x) = 1 OR (  f(x) = -1 AND c = 3 ) ) 
7a:   Return f(0)x(n – k)  ⊗ b(x) (mod xn-1) 
  Else 
7b:   Return NoInverse; 
 } 
8: If ( NumDegrees(  f(x) ) < NumDegrees( g(x) ) ) 
 { 
9:  Swap f(x) & g(x) 
10:  Swap b(x) & c(x) 
 } 
10a: If ( c = 3 AND (  f(0) = g(0) ) ) 
 { 
11:  f(x) = f(x) - g(x) (mod  c) 
12:  b(x) = b(x) - c(x) (mod c) 
 } 
 ELSE 
 { 
13:  f(x) = f(x) + g(x) (mod c) 
14:  b(x) = b(x) + c(x) (mod c)  
 } 
Algorithm 4.3: AIA(a(x), b(x), n, c) 
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To demonstrate the property of inversion, an example detailing the process involved in 
finding the inverse of polynomial b using the AIA, Algorithm 4.3, is shown.   
 
Given: N = 5, p = 3, b = 1 + x2 – x4 
Find: B = b-1 
 
Tables 4.1-4.5, illustrate the number of ‘rounds’ required to find the inverse of b = 1 + x2 
– x4.  A ‘round’ is characterized by the variable k and is incremented whenever the 
conditional f(0) = 0 is satisfied for polynomial f(x) (Step 2 of Algorithm 4.3).  Each 
column is labeled with the variable name referenced in the AIA Algorithm 4.3, with the 
column labeled ‘Step’ corresponding to the particular operation step in the algorithm.  
The first entry in Table 4.1 is the initial setup as shown in the ‘Init’ section of Algorithm 
4.3. 
 
k b(x) c(x) f(x) g(x) Step 
0 1 0 1 + x2 - x4 -1 + x5   
      -1 + x5 1 + x2 - x4 9 
  0 1     10 
      x2 -x4 + x5   13 
  1       14 
      x -x3 + x4   3 
    x     4 
1         5 
1 1 x x -x3 + x4 1 + x2 - x4   
Table 4.1: k = 1 Round of AIA 
k b(x) c(x) f(x) g(x) Step 
1 1 x x -x3 + x4 1 + x2 - x4   
      1 - x2 + x3   3 
    x2     4 
2         5 
2 1 x2 1 - x2 + x3 1 + x2 - x4   
Table 4.2: k = 2 Round of AIA 
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k b(x) c(x) f(x) g(x) Step 
2 1 x2 1 - x2 + x3 1 + x2 - x4   
      1 + x2 - x4 1 - x2 + x3 9 
  x2 1     10 
      2x2 - x3 - x4   11 
  -1 + x2       12 
      2x - x2 - x3   3 
    x     4 
3         5 
3 -1 + x2 x 2x - x2 - x3 1 - x2 + x3   
Table 4.3: k = 3 Round of AIA 
k b(x) c(x) f(x) g(x) Step 
3 -1 + x2 x 2x - x2 - x3 1 - x2 + x3   
      2 - x - x2   3 
    x2     4 
4         5 
4 -1 + x2 x2 2 - x - x2 1 - x2 + x3   
Table 4.4: k = 4 Round of AIA 
k b(x) c(x) f(x) g(x) Step
4 -1 + x2 x2 2 - x - x2 1 - x2 + x3   
      1 - x2 + x3 2 - x - x2 9 
  x2 -1 + x2     10 
      3 - x -2x2 + x3   13 
  -1 + X2       14 
      -1 - 2x + x2   3 
    -x + x3     4 
5         5 
      1 - 3x   13 
  -1 -x + 2x2 + x3       14 
5 -1 -x + 2x2 + x3 -x + x3 1 2 - x - x2   
Table 4.5: k = 5 Round of AIA 
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The effects of modulo reduction throughout the AIA can be observed in Step 13 of Table 
4.5.  After the ‘Addition’ Step 13, the coefficient 3 was reduced to zero thereby 
decreasing the polynomial by one degree.   
Algorithm 4.3 continues to increment variable k until the number of degrees of 
f(x) = 0 (Step 6a).  Step 6b is evaluated next and is responsible for determining whether 
or not the polynomial is actually invertible.  If f(x) !=  ± 1, Algorithm 4.3 is aborted and 
returns a value indicating no inverse exists (Step 7b).  If an inverse is found, i.e. f(x) = ± 
1, Step 7a is executed to reveal the inverted polynomial B as follows: 
 
 )1(mod)()0( )( −⊗= − nkn xxbxfB  (Step 7a of Algorithm 4.3) 
)1(mod)21()1( 532)55( −++−−⊗= − xxxxxB  
)1(mod)21()1)(1( 532 −++−−⊗= xxxxB  
 3221 xxxB ++−−=  (Inverse polynomial) 
 
As a final check for inversion, Equation (16) is used to verify polynomial B is the inverse 
polynomial of b. 
 
)1(mod)(mod1 −=⊗ NxpBb  
)1(mod)3(mod1)21()1( 53242 −=++−−⊗−+ xxxxxx  
 
Using Equation (14) the convolution of polynomials within ring R is computed. 
  
 )1(mod)3(mod1)2221( 57654543232 −=−−++++−−++−− xxxxxxxxxxxx  
 )1(mod)3(mod12231 576542 −=−−+++−− xxxxxxx  
 
To keep the polynomial constrained to ring R, exponents ≥ N = 5, are rotated. 
 
 )1(mod)3(mod12231 557565542 −=−−+++−− −−− xxxxxxx  
 )1(mod)3(mod12231 521042 −=−−+++−− xxxxxxx  
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 )1(mod)3(mod12231 5242 −=−−+++−− xxxxxx  
 )1(mod)3(mod1331 54 −=+− xxx  
 
A final modulo reduction of p = 3 proves B = b-1 
 
1 – 3x + 3x4 = 1 (mod 3) (mod x5 – 1) 
)1(mod)3(mod11 5 −= x  
 
Therefore: 
 
B = b-1 
14232 )1()21( −−+=++−− xxxxx  
4.3.3 Public Key 
The NTRU public key calculation requires computation of another inverse polynomial fq.   
The calculation is very similar to the private key calculation of fp, with the only 
difference being the inverse calculation uses the larger modulo value q.  Since q must be 
much larger than p, using Algorithm 4.3 exclusively to find the inverse fq is not possible 
due to its modulo constraint of either p =  2 or p = 3.  Closer examination of the large 
value q used in NTRUEncrypt, reveals that it is always a number base log2.   This 
property of q derives a second version, Algorithm 4.4, of the AIA [15] that builds upon 
the original AIA Algorithm 4.3.     
To illustrate how fq is calculated, a value of q = 32 is chosen.  The value 32 can be 
represented as a multiple of base 2 numbers such that: 
 
32 = 2(2)(2)(2)(2) = 25 
 
Since the number 32 is equivalent to log2(32) = 5, Algorithm 4.3 is utilized in the first 
step of calculating fq by calculating polynomial f module p = 2, f2. Following the exact 
same steps as the example in Tables 4.1-4.5, except with a modulo value of p = 2 instead 
of p = 3, f2 is found.  Using the resultant f2 inverse polynomial and log2(32) calls to 
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Algorithm 4.3, f32 is calculated using Algorithm 4.4.  Closer examination of Algorithm 
4.4, step 3, shows the original f2, represented as a(x), being convolution multiplied by 
itself log2(32) times to ultimately calculated f32. 
 
Since not all polynomials will have an inverse, a new random small polynomial f will 
need to be chosen and the inverse calculations, fp and fq, performed again until successful.  
Generating and testing for inversion is a time consuming process especially if an inverse 
is not found and the process needs to be repeated.  An optimization that will be discussed 
in the next section eliminates the need to calculate the inverse polynomial fp, thereby 
reducing key generation time and the storage space required for fp.  
Using polynomial g and inverse polynomial fq from above, calculation of the 
public key, h, is found: 
 
 )(mod qgpfh q ⊗=  (17) 
 
Input:  a(x) – Polynomial to invert 
n – Nth degree size of polynomial 
c – Modulo value to apply to coefficients 
q – Modulo value base 2 
  
Output: b(x) ≡ a(x)-1 – Inverse polynomial of a(x) (mod c) 
   
Init: q = 2 
1: While ( q < c ) 
 { 
2:  q = q*2 
3:  b(x) = b(x)⊗ (2 – a(x)⊗ b(x)) (mod q) 
 } 
Algorithm 4.4: AIA_Q(a(x), b(x), n, c, q) 
   30
 
 
The first operation to compute the public key, h(x), is to perform the star multiplication of 
fq(x)⊗ g(x) as shown in Step 1 of Algorithm 4.5 using Equation (14).  Step 2 iterates 
through each position of h(x), multiplying by p modulo reduction q as shown in Step 3.  
4.4 Encryption 
The encryption process converts a plaintext message m into a suitable ciphertext e that is 
broadcast to the recipient.  Encrypting a message involves translating the binary plaintext 
message m into a polynomial message construct M with coefficients ranging from 
2
)1( −− p  to 
2
)1( −p  using Table 4.6: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Input:  fq(x) – Secret polynomial key fq 
 g(x) – Secret polynomial g 
 p - NTRUEncrypt ‘p’ parameter 
 q – NTRUEncrypt ‘q’ parameter 
 n – Degree size of polynomial 
 
Output: h(x) – Public key polynomial )(mod qgpfh q ⊗=  
 
1: )(mod)()()( qxgxfxh q ⊗=  
2: For (i = 0 to n) 
 { 
3:  )(mod)*)(()( qpihih =  
 } 
Algorithm 4.5: CalcPublicKey(fq(x),  g(x), h(x), p, q, n) 
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Input: Plaintext message m binary bit 
pattern 
Output: Message construct M trinary 
pattern 
{0,0,0} {0,0} 
{0,0,1} {0,1} 
{0,1,0} {0,-1} 
{0,1,1} {1,0} 
{1,0,0} {1,1} 
{1,0,1} {1,-1} 
{1,1,0} {-1,0} 
{1,1,1} {-1,1} 
Table 4.6: Binary to trinary conversion 
 
The transformation from binary to trinary increases the message density thereby allowing 
a larger binary plaintext message m to be stored in message construct M at a 3-to-2 ratio.  
 In order to provide plaintext awareness [2], a blinding polynomial r is generated 
with the same criteria as g per the following requirements: 
 
- Polynomial r must contain dr number of coefficients equal to ‘+1’, dr 
number of coefficients equal to ‘-1’ and the remaining N-2dr coefficients 
equal to ‘0’. 
- To ensure security, generation of polynomial r needs to be random 
generated by means of a Random Number Generator (RNG) or Index 
Generation Function (IGF) detailed in [22]. 
 
Once a valid blinding polynomial r is selected, it is multiplied with the public key h.  The 
final step is to add message m mod q to the product of hr ⊗ to produce the encrypted 
ciphertext message e. 
 
 )(mod qmhre +⊗=  (18) 
 
   32
Algorithm 4.6 was written to perform encryption which performs one polynomial star 
multiplication and a polynomial addition. 
 
 
4.5 Decryption 
Decryption reverses the encryption process to obtain the original message m.  The first 
step in the decryption process is to obtain the intermediate polynomial a, from the 
ciphertext e, using the private polynomial keys fp and f [2]. 
 
 )(mod qefa ⊗=  (19) 
 
To ensure a high probability of decryption success, the coefficients of polynomial a must 
be adjusted so that all coefficients range from 
2
q−  to 
2
q  instead of  0 to q.  Details 
regarding why this step is required is discussed in the next section under Decryption 
Failures. 
Once the coefficients are ‘balanced’, polynomial a is star multiplied by the 
inverse private key polynomial fp and reduced modulo p.   
 
 )(mod pafb p ⊗=  (20) 
 
Input:  r(x) – Blinding polynomial key r 
 h(x) – Public key polynomial h 
 m(x) – Message polynomial to encrypt 
 p - NTRUEncrypt ‘p’ parameter 
 q – NTRUEncrypt ‘q’ parameter 
 n – Degree size of polynomial 
 
Output: e(x) – Ciphertext polynomial )(mod qmhre +⊗=  
 
1: )(mod)()()( qxhxrxe ⊗=  
2: )(mod)()( qmxexe +=  
Algorithm 4.6: Encrypt(r(x), h(x), m(x), e(x) p, q, n) 
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Next, the original message construct M is derived by an additional module p reduction.  
 
 )(mod pbM =  (21) 
 
A subtle step, that is not very well documented, is needed to correctly recover message 
construct M.  Various coefficients throughout the algorithm are negative and therefore 
there exist instances where the multiplication of two negatives coefficients or modulo 
reduction of a negative coefficient results in a positive coefficient.   Since the decrypted 
message construct M must maintain a trinary form, its coefficient need to be ‘balanced’ 
around zero the same way polynomial a was.   Algorithm 4.7 was written to rotate a 
polynomial into a trinary form. 
 
 
 
The final step in the decryption process is to convert the message construct M from a 
trinary form back to the original binary plaintext message m using Table 4.7. 
 
 
Input:  a(x) – Polynomial to convert 
 p - NTRUEncrypt ‘p’ parameter 
 n – Degree size of polynomial 
 
Output:  a(x) – Polynomial with trinary coefficients (-1, 0, 1) 
 
Init: maxCoef = 2 
 
1: for ( i = 0 to n ) 
2: { 
3:  a(i) = Mod( a(i), p ) 
4:  if ( a(i) >= maxCoef ) 
5:   a(i) = a(i) – p 
6:  if ( a(i) <= ( -1 * maxCoef ) 
7:   a(i) = a(i) + p 
8: } 
Algorithm 4.7: ConvertToTrinary(a(x), p, n) 
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Input: Message construct M trinary 
pattern  
Output: Plaintext message m binary bit 
pattern 
{0,0} {0,0,0} 
{0,1} {0,0,1} 
{0,-1} {0,1,0} 
{1,0} {0,1,1} 
{1,1} {1,0,0} 
{1,-1} {1,0,1} 
{-1,0} {1,1,0} 
{-1,1} {1,1,1} 
Table 4.7: Trinary to binary conversion 
4.6 Decryption Failures 
A decryption failure is when the plaintext message output of the decryption step does not 
match the original input message.  NTRUEncrypt is unique to other PCKS in that, with 
standard parameters, ciphertext can fail to decrypt [48].   
Given a polynomial of the form: 
( ) )(mod... 11221100 qXaXaXaXaXa NN −−+++=  
The minimum and maximum coefficients are defined as: 
},...,,min{))(( 110 −= NaaaXaMin , },...,,max{))(( 110 −= NaaaXaMax  
The width of a polynomial is the polynomial’s range: 
)(())(())(( XaMinXaMaxXaWidth −=  
To understand decryption failures, Equation 19 utilizes the following substitutions: 
 
 )(mod qefa ⊗=  
Substitution for: )(mod qmhre +⊗=   
)(mod qmfhrfa ⊗+⊗⊗=  
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Substitution for: )(mod qgpfh q ⊗=  
)(mod qmfgpfrfa q ⊗+⊗⊗⊗=  
Reduce: )(mod1 qff q ≡⊗  
)(mod qmfgpra ⊗+⊗⊗=  
Since the coefficients of r, g, f and m are small, relative to q, their products will have a 
small Width [50].  The objective is to find a modulo q interval that results in a successful 
decryption, such that: 
 
)(mod)1()1()1()1()1()1( qmfgpra ⊗+⊗⊗=  
 
If an incorrect modulo q interval is chosen, a decryption failure will occur since the 
modulo q is incorrectly ‘zeroing’ out the coefficients of the polynomial.  A successful 
decryption occurs when the degree-one-or-higher terms of the inverse polynomial fp 
cancel out, instead of the module q ‘zeroing’ out the terms.   
 A ‘gap’ decryption failure occurs when Width ≥ q, while a ‘wrap’ decryption 
failure occurs if Width < q.  With either failure, the resulting message m will be incorrect 
by some multiple of q mod p [50].  The probability of a decryption failure can be 
significantly reduced if the modulo q interval is adjusted such that the polynomial 
coefficients are centered on zero and range from  
2
q−  to 
2
q  instead of  0 to q.  Algorithm 
4.8 was written to ‘balance’ a polynomial by forcing all coefficients outside into the 
range of 
2
q−  to 
2
q . 
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4.7 Why Decryption Works 
For a cryptosystem to be useful, it must consistently be able to reproduce the original 
plaintext message, from ciphertext, without any errors.  The steps involved in the 
encryption and decryption process constrain the various polynomials to modulo p or 
module q space.  The encryption process combines several small modulo p constrained 
polynomials together to form a larger modulo q constrained polynomial [37].  Since the 
initial polynomials are constrained to a small modulo p, modulo reduction by q has no 
affect on the polynomial coefficients.  However, the steps involved in decryption start 
with a polynomial constrained to the large modulo q space and work backwards reducing 
the polynomials to the smaller modulo p space.    
Starting from the encrypted ciphertext e and working backwards, Figure 4.1 
illustrates the necessary variable substitutions to obtain the original plaintext c. 
 
Input:  f(x) – Polynomial to balance 
 n – Degree size of polynomial 
 q – NTRUEncrypt ‘q’ parameter 
 
Output: f(x) – Balance polynomial around 
2
q  
Init: maxCoef = 
2
q  
1: For (i = 0 to n) 
 { 
2:  If( f(i) > maxCoef ) 
3:   f(i) = f(i) – q 
4:  If( f(i) < -maxCoef ) 
5:   f(i) = f(i) + q 
 } 
Algorithm 4.8: BalancePoly(f(x), n, q) 
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Figure 4.2: Flow chart from encrypted ciphertext e to plaintext c 
 
Starting with the original ciphertext equation (18), substitutions for variables e and h 
using Equations (19) and (17) respectively results in an expanded definition of variable a 
[Substitution 1] in Figure 4.2.  The multiplicative inverse identity of Equation (15) and 
the substitution of the plaintext definition of Equation (20) reduces the definition of 
variable a to three variables p, r and m [Substitution 2].  The modulo q reduction of this 
step does not affect any coefficients as long as the rules pertaining to q being large 
relative to p are enforced.  The final [Substitution 3], performs a modulo reduction p 
which cancels out all terms except for the desired plaintext message m.   
 
 
      
)(mod qmhre +⊗=
Equation (19) Equation (17)
Equation (18)
)(mod1 qff q ≡⊗
)(mod qmfrpfa q +⊗⊗=
)(mod qefa ⊗= )(mod qgpfh q ⊗=
Equation (15)
)(mod pafc p ⊗= Reduce (mod q)
mrpa +⊗=
Equation (20)
mprpfc p +⊗= )(mod
)(mod pmc =
Reduce (mod p)
[Substitution 1]
[Substitution 2]
[Substitution 3]
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5 NTRUEncrypt Optimizations 
The core mathematics involved in almost every step of the NTRU algorithm involves 
some form of polynomial multiplication.  Techniques that reduce the execution time 
required for polynomial multiplication directly improves the efficiency of NTRU.   
5.1 Star Multiplication 
Recall standard star multiplication of two polynomials, a(x) and b(x), contained in ring R 
and both being N-degrees in size, is performed utilizing aforementioned Equation (14).  
The pseudo-code version used throughout the NTRUEncrypt algorithm is detailed in 
Algorithm 5.1. 
 
  
Input:  a(x) – First polynomial 
b(x) – Second polynomial 
n – Size of polynomials a(x) and b(x) 
d – Size of output polynomial h(x) 
m – Modulo value to apply to coefficients 
 
Output: c(x) = a(x)⊗ b(x) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1) 
 
Init: c(x) = 0, val = 0, exp = 0, i = 0, j = 0 
 
1: For ( i = 0 to n ) 
 { 
2: If ( a(i) != 0 ) 
 { 
3: For ( j = 0 to n ) 
 { 
4: If ( b(j) != 0 ) 
 { 
5:  exp = (i + j) (mod d) 
6: val = c[exp] + a(i)b(i) 
7: c[exp] = Mod(val, m) 
 } 
 } 
 } 
 }  
Algorithm 5.1: Star_Multiply(a(x), b(x), c(x), n, d, m) 
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The convolution of two polynomials using traditional multiplication in code utilizes two 
nested loops as seen in Steps 1 and 3 of Algorithm 5.1.  Step 5 calculates and stores the 
rotation amount, exp, of the exponents within ring R.  Steps 6 and 7 perform the 
multiplication of the input polynomials, reduction modulo m, and adds the resulting 
product to the correct polynomial coefficient. One very simple optimization to Algorithm 
5.1 is shown in Steps 2 and 4.  These two ‘If’ checks prevent any further execution of the 
polynomial multiplication in Steps 5-7 if the coefficient of any polynomial equals zero.  
Though this optimization has no affect on non-zero coefficients, ‘Zero Check’ reduces 
the execution time required for generating the NTRUEncrypt private key polynomials 
since approximately 1/3 of the secret polynomial coefficients for f, g and r are chosen to 
equal zero per Section 4.3. Algorithm 5.1 requires very little RAM to execute, but has a 
growth rate of O(n2) 
5.2 Karatsuba 
The Karatsuba Algorithm (KA) was introduced in 1963 by Anatolii Alexeevitch 
Karatsuba [40] as a technique to improve the time required to multiply two polynomials.  
The technique reduces the number of coefficient multiplications involved in standard 
multiplication techniques, but at the expenses of utilizing extra additions [39].   
5.3 Karatsuba Multiplication 
In contrast to traditional multiplication, KA requires more RAM to execute, but decreases 
execution times by decomposing each input polynomial into several smaller polynomials. 
Weimerskirch et al [39], demonstrates the steps required to multiply two, one 
degree, polynomials based on KA as follows given polynomials f(x) and g(x) in one pass: 
 
xffxf 10)( += , xggxg 10)( +=  
 
Components of polynomials f(x) and g(x) are extracted and stored in three intermediate 
variables, fg0, fg1 and rfg as follows:  
 
000 gffg = , 111 gffg = , ))(( 1010 ggffrfg ++=  
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The resulting product of h(x) = f(x)g(x) is performed as follows: 
 
010
2
1 )()()( fgxfgfgrxfgxh fg +−−+=  
 
In comparison to traditional multiplication, which requires n2 = 22 = 4 multiplications and 
(n – 1)2 = (2 – 1)2 = 1 additions, the KA method requires 4 additions and 3 
multiplications.  KA therefore saves 1 multiplication, but required 3 additional additions 
[39]. 
5.4 Recursive Karatsuba (KM) 
Polynomial multiplication using KA for only one iteration, as seen above, can be 
extended to incorporate recursion.  The recursive KA method, referred to as KM in this 
thesis, is nothing more than ‘splitting’ the polynomials f(x) and g(x) into two halves and 
applying the aforementioned one-pass KA algorithm repeatedly until the polynomial size, 
n, is equal to 1.   
The technique to apply KM for multiplying any two, even, n-size polynomials 
was modified slightly to accommodate odd values of n as suggested by Silverman [43].  
The major change involved using the smaller of the two polynomial sizes after the split 
rather than just n/2.  Application of KM is outlines in Algorithm 5.2. 
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Slight changes to the recursive version of KM presented by Weimerskirch et al [39] 
included constraining polynomials f(x) and g(x) to the ring, R, of truncated polynomials 
in steps 3b, 5, 12, and 13 or whenever multiplication of polynomials occurred.  Also, a 
coefficient reduction modulo c is performed for any operation on a coefficient. 
 
Given: f(x) = -1 – x, g(x) = -1 – x, n = 2, c = 3, threshold = 1 
Find: h(x) = f(x)g(x) (mod c) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1) using KM 
 
Input:  F(x) – First polynomial 
G(x) – Second polynomial 
H(x) – Product of F(x) and G(x) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1) 
n – Size of polynomials 
c – Modulo value to apply to coefficients 
cutOff – Minimum value of n for KM to execute 
 
Output: H(x) = F(x)⊗G(x) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / xn – 1 
 
Init: ls = n / 2, hs =  n – ls, count = 0,  
 
1: count = count + 1 
2: If ( n = 1 ) 
 { 
 If ( F(0) = 0 OR G(0) = 0 ) 
3a: Return 0; 
 Else 
3b: Return H(x) = Mod( F(x)*G(x), c) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1) 
 } 
4: If ( n < cutOff ) 
5: Star_Multiply(F(x), G(x), H(x), n, c) 
6: FL = F0x0 … Flsxls 
7: FH = Fls+1xls+1 … Fhsxhs 
8: GL = G0x0 … Glsxls 
9: GH = Gls+1xls+1 … Ghsxhs 
10: FGL = FLGL = KM_STAR(FL, GL, FGL, ls, c) 
11: FGH = FHGH = KM_STAR(FH, GH, FGH, ls, c) 
12: Rfg = (FL + FH)(GL + GH) 
 = KM_STAR((FL + FH), (GL + GH), Rfg, hs, c) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1) 
13: H(x) = Mod( (FGH(x2ls) + (Rfg – FGL – FGH)(xls) + FGL)) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1) 
Algorithm 5.2: KM_STAR(F(x), G(x), H(x), n, c, cutOff) 
   42
 
Figure 5.1: KM Example 
5.5 KM Performance 
KM splits the input polynomial into two segments for each iteration of the algorithm.  
Figure 5.2 details the polynomial sizes (N) for each iteration for an initial N = 107.  For 
Iteration 1 of KM, the original N = 107 is divided into two smaller polynomials of N = 53 
and N = 54.  Each iteration of the KM ‘splits’ the previous N in half, thereby forming a 
binary tree. As the binary tree grows, the number of polynomials increases while their 
respective N-size decreases until each branch of the tree is reduced to an N = 1 as shown 
in Step 2 of Algorithm 5.2.  Depending on the initial N-size, the ‘splitting’ involved in 
KM quickly composes a large binary tree requiring significant memory.  
 
Init: ls = n / 2 = 2 / 2 = 1,  
        hs =  n – ls = 2 – 1 = 1 
 
6: FL = -1 
7: FH = -1 
8: GL = -1 
9: GH = -1 
10: FGL = FLGL = (-1)(-1) = 1 (mod 3) 
11: FGH = FHGH = (-1)(-1) = 1 (mod 3) 
12: Rfg = (FL + FH)(GL + GH)  
       = (-1 – 1)(-1 – 1) 
       = 4 (mod 3) = 1 (mod 3) 
13: H(x) = (FGH(x2ls) + (Rfg – FGL – FGH)(xls) + FGL) 
            = (1(x2) + (1 – 1 – 1)(x1) + 1) (mod 3) 
          = x2 – x + 1 (mod 3) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1) 
         = x2-n + 2x + 1 (mod 3) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1) 
         = x2-2 + 2x + 1 (mod 3) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1) 
         = 1 +2x + 1 (mod 3) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1) 
         = 2 + 2x (mod 3) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1) 
16: H(x) = (2 +2x)(mod 3) in (Z/(c)Z)[x] / (xn – 1) 
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Figure 5.2: KM polynomial Count [] and Size (N) for each iteration for N=107 
 
Benchmarking of KM relative to traditional multiplication was performed on a MICAz 
mote [25] with nesC [28] implementations of both.  The test was composed of 
performing convolution, within ring R, two polynomials, f(x) and g(x), with coefficients 
equal to ‘+1’ and a N-size equal to 107.  The initial tests using polynomials f(x) and g(x) 
showed KM to have poorer performance in terms of longer execution times than 
traditional multiplication.  Driessen et al also noticed this performance decrease and 
attributed the drop in performance to the overhead of the recursion having to build 
another function stack [15].  To understand the affects of stack maintenance on 
performance for KM, the value of ‘CutOff’ , as shown in Step 4 of Algorithm 5.2, was 
modified.  The ‘Cutoff’ variable determines whether to continue the recursive calls to 
KM or to switch over to using the star multiply Algorithm 5.1.  A ‘Cutoff’ value larger 
than the initial input polynomials N-size will disable KM and always execute the star 
multiplication, Algorithm 5.1.  Selecting a ‘Cutoff’ equal to ‘1’ will have the opposite 
effect, thereby always calling the KM, Algorithm 5.2, and never executing the Algorithm 
5.1.   Selecting an intermediate ‘CutOff’ value will utilize both Algorithms 5.1 and 5.2.  
N=107
N=53 N=54
N=27 N=27
N=14N=13
N=7 N=7
N=3 N=4
N=2 N=2
N=1 N=1
Iteration 1
Iteration 2
Iteration 3
Iteration 4
Iteration 5
Iteration 6
Iteration 7
[2]
[4]
[8]
[16]
[32]
[64]
[86] = 2(107 – 64)
[1]
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To demonstrate the effect the ‘CutOff’ value has on execution time, Table 5.1 
summarizes the execution time required to perform the convolution of f(x) and g(x) 
within ring R for N = 107.  
 
CutOff Value Number of Iterations Execution Time (ms) 
108 0 622 
55 1 543 
28 2 452 
15 3 398 
8 4 385 
5 5 441 
3 6 576 
1 7 727 
Table 5.1: KM execution time versus CutOff value 
As previously mentioned, the first entry executes star multiplication, Algorithm 5.1, since 
the ‘CutOff’ value is larger than the polynomial N-size of 107.  Utilizing Algorithm 5.1  
exclusively resulted in a 622ms execution time.  Decreasing the ‘CutOff’ value below the 
input polynomial N-size starts to enable the recursive iterations of the KM.  Selecting a 
‘CutOff’ value equal to 1 disables all Algorithm 5.1 executions and relies on complete 
KM usage.  Since recursion is being executed for every N-size polynomial in KM, the 
overhead of stack maintenance results in the worst performance time of 727ms.   With a 
careful selection of a ‘CutOff’ value, equal to 8, between the two aforementioned 
extremes, an overall improved execution time of 385ms was obtained using only 4 out of 
a possible 7 iterations of KM.  Any further decrease in the ‘CutOff’ value increases 
execution time due to the excessive stack overhead involved in recursion. 
5.6 Private Key Polynomial fp  
During the key generation phase in Section 4.3, polynomial f was randomly generated 
until the following properties of the polynomial were met [45]: 
 
- f is invertible mod p 
   45
- f is invertible mod q 
 
While the random generation of f is fairly quick, performing the AIA (Algorithm 4.3)  is 
very time consuming, especially if an inverse for f is not found and the AIA needs to 
execute again.  An optimization used in the commercial release of NTRUEncrypt that 
eliminates the need to find the inverse polynomial fp utilizes the following property of f 
[45]: 
 
 Fpf *1+=  (22) 
 
Since the AIA success criteria for a polynomial to be invertible is f(0) = ± 1 (mod p), as 
shown in step 6b, one option is to generate a random polynomial F, star multiply by p and 
add 1.  The star multiplication of F and p ensures a modulo reduction of p exists along 
with satisfying the f(0) = ± 1 (mod p) criteria of the AIA.  Generating a known invertible 
polynomial f  benefits the NTRU algorithm in two regards: 
 
- Polynomial f is guaranteed to be invertible mod p and therefore eliminates 
the AIA check for inverse. 
- The second polynomial star multiplication of fp and a in the decryption 
formula (20) is no longer required, thereby reducing the decryption 
execution time. 
 
Algorithm 5.3  was used to generate a guaranteed invertible fp  
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6 Evaluation and Performance 
The intent of this thesis was to perform a like-for-like comparison of NTRUEncrypt 
against ECIES.  To ensure the comparison would be as fair as possible, a version of each 
cryptosystem was chosen that had equivalent symmetric bit security levels. The work by 
Kouzmenko concluded that NTRUEncrypt-251 and ECC-163 both have an equivalent 
asymmetric security level of 80-bits [35].  Since the NTRUEncrypt-251 was based on a 
prime field, the prime field based ECIES-160 was chosen over the equivalent security 
level, non-prime field based, ECIES-163 [38]. 
6.1 Hardware 
The MICAz mote, from Crossbow Technologies [25] in Figure 6.1, was used in the 
characterization and benchmarking of ECIES-160 versus NTRUEncrypt-251. 
Programming and PC communication with the mote utilizes the MIB520 USB Gateway 
in  Figure 6.2.   
 
Input: f(x) – Polynomial to invert 
 n – Size of polynomials a(x) and b(x) 
 m – Modulo value to apply to coefficients 
 
Output:  g(x) – Invertible polynomial  
 
1: g(x) = f(x) 
2: for ( i = 0 to n ) 
 { 
3:  g(x) = g(x) * m 
 } 
4: g(0) = Mod( g(0) + 1, m ) 
Algorithm 5.3: CreateInvertible(f(x),  g(x), n, m) 
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Figure 6.1:Crossbow MICAz 
 
Figure 6.2: Crossbow MIB520 Gateway 
The MICAz is an Atmel based 8-bit ATMega128L microcontroller [36] that contains a 
2.4GHz IEEE 802.15.4 compliant RF transceiver and 4KB of RAM.  A listing of the 
main specifications of the MICAz  mote is summarized in Table 6.1. 
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Processor Performance MPR2400CA (ATmega128L) 
Clock 0 – 8 MHz 
Program Flash Memory 128K bytes 
Measurement (Serial) Flash 512K bytes 
Configuration EEPROM 4K bytes 
Current Draw 8mA – Active Mode 
 < 15 µA – Sleep Mode 
RF Transceiver  
Transmit Data Rate 250kbs 
Frequency Band 2400 MHz to 2483.5 MHz 
Outdoor Range 75m – 100m 
Indoor Range 10m – 30m 
Current Draw 19.7mA – Receive Mode 
 17.4mA – Transmit, 0dBm 
Electromechanical  
Battery 2X AA Batteries 
External Power 2.7V – 3.3V 
Table 6.1: MICAz (MPR2400CA) Hardware Specification 
 
The MICAz mote contains expansions connectors that allow auxiliary inputs to be 
acquired such as light, temperature and acceleration, though for this thesis the base 
MICAz mote is the only required hardware. 
6.2 Software 
The MICAz motes run on TinyOS, which is open source operating system specifically 
designed for embedded sensor network devices [27].  It features various component 
libraries that include sensor drivers along with network protocols.  Since TinyOS is open 
source, it is very easy to extend the base functionality of the pre-distributed drivers to suit 
the unique needs of the developer.   
 The MoteWorks version 2.0.F [51] of TinyOS 1.x was used exclusively through 
this thesis as the primary operating system for the MICAz.  Though any version of 
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TinyOS 1.x would have sufficed, the MoteWork’s released included the custom nesC 
header file, SOdebug.h, which provided a very nice interface to output code debug 
information to the PC using the MICAz’s USB port.  Without this powerful interface, 
debugging of the code in TinyOS 1.x would have been significantly more difficult. 
 The now deprecated TinyOS 1.x version was used instead of the latest TinyOS 
2.1 version because the only operating system TinyECC supports is TinyOS 1.x.  The use 
of TinyOS 2.1 would have eliminated the need for the MoteWorks version since TinyOS 
2.1 includes improved interfaces for debugging code via the USB serial port.    
6.3 Test Setup 
A standard PC with an USB port was used to program and collect data from the MICAz 
mote.  TinyOS version 1.1, supplied within the MoteWorks release, was installed on the 
PC and used in the nesC code development of NTRUEncrypt and collection of timing 
data for ECIES.   
6.4 ECIES-160 Results 
TinyECC [26] is a publically available software package that operates on TinyOS [27] 
and provides an ECC based public key cryptosystem for WSNs.  It contains full 
implementations of the following ECC schemes: 
 
- ECDH – Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement 
- ECDSA – Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
- ECIES – Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme 
 
ECIES was chosen as the ECC version to compare NTRUEncrypt throughout this thesis 
for its basic properties of encryption and decryption.  ECIES differs from ECDSA in that 
ECDSA only provides signature generation and verification without an encryption of the 
message and would be better suited to compare against NTRUSign [36]. 
There are a number of optimization switches for ECIES that can be enabled at 
compilation time that will reduce execution times for initialization, encryption and 
decryption.  To provide a fair comparison of execution times for the various operations 
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between ECIES and NTRUEncrypt, all optimization switches were enabled which 
provided “the most computationally efficient configuration” [17].  A full listing of the 
switches along with details of each setting can be found in the TinyECC paper [17].    
The TinyECC implementation of ECIES-160 by Liu et al [26], using the 
recommended elliptic curve domain parameters specified in secp160r1 [10], was 
compiled and install on a MICAz mote in an effort to recreate and compare execution 
times.  With all optimizations enabled and the results average over 10 iterations, Figure 
6.3 shows the actual results obtained after compiling and executing the ‘testECIESM.nc’ 
file released under TinyECC. 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Actual ECIES-160 Execution Times 
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Table 6.2 summarizing the results obtained in this thesis along with those observed by 
Liu et al [17]. 
 
ECIES Operation Liu et al (ms) This Work (ms) 
Initialization 1834.74 1838.74 
Encryption 3907.34 3907.49 
Decryption 2632.66 2632.59 
 Table 6.2 Liu et al vs. my work timing results for ECIES-160 
The Initialization time for ECIES includes the time required to setup the Barrett 
Reduction and Sliding Window optimizations used in ECIES.  Barrett Reduction is an 
alternative method for performing modulo reduction by using pre-computed modulo 
reciprocals along with multiplication operations instead of division [52].  The Sliding 
Window optimization speeds up scalar multiplications by storing pre-computed product 
combinations with a window width of w bits [17].  By performing the multiplication and 
storing the product ahead of time for a window width w, only one addition operation 
every w bits is needed for a scalar multiplication.   
 The output in Figure 6.3 shows initialization, public key generation, encryption 
and decryption times, but does not show the execution time for the private key.  To 
understand the amount of time required to generate the private key in ECIES-160, the 
TinyECC code for the ECIESM.nc and show_ecies.java classes were modified to output 
the private key generation time as shown in Figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4: Actual ECIES-160 Execution Times Including Private Key Generation 
The results indicate a negligible amount of time is required to compute the private 
key in ECIES, i.e. 0.2ms, as shown as ‘private key gen’ in Figure 6.4  The time is small 
since it involves only selecting a random integer within the order of the base point for the 
elliptic curve as detailed in section 3.1.1. 
The recreation of Liu et al’s results provides confidence that the timing results 
obtained from this thesis’s NTRUEncrypt implementation will be comparable to that of 
the ECIES-160 TinyECC version.  
6.5 NTRUEncrypt-251 Implementation and Results 
NTRUEncrypt’s security is based on the values selected for parameters N, p and q.  The 
initial suggested values from both NTRU.com [31] and CEES [49] are shown in Table 
6.3. 
 
Security Level N p Q df dg dr 
Low 107 3 64 15 12 5 
Moderate 167 3 128 61 20 18 
Standard 251 3 128 72 72 72 
Table 6.3: NTRUEncrypt parameter selection based on security 
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As years have passed, recent attacks such as meet-in-the-middle (MITM) and lattice 
reduction [21] against NTRUEncrypt have revealed short falls in the original parameter 
sets in Table 6.3.  As a result, newly suggested parameters recently, release in 2009, 
indicate the selection of yet larger values of N, p and q.  For comparison purposes, 
Hirschhorn et al now suggests for 112-bit security with a compromise between speed and 
code space, that N = 541, p = 3 and q = 2048 [21].  These values will continue to be 
assumed stable until the next successful attack proves them ineffective. 
The complete implementation of NTRUEncrypt-251 was written in nesC utilizing 
all of the pseudo-code algorithms mentioned in the previous sections.  When applicable, 
the code utilized 1-byte, or 8-bit, sized registers to minimize memory usage. This 
constraint limits the register to a signed size ranging from -127 to +127.  Therefore, the 
NTRUEncrypt-251 requirement of modulo q = 128 reduction of coefficients was not 
possible. In order to store polynomial coefficients that can be reduced by q = 128, the 
storage size for coefficients in the microprocessor code were increased to 2-bytes, or 16-
bits.  Since the MICAz mote contains 4kB of 8-bit data registers, increasing the 
coefficient storage size to 16-bits doubled the required amount of RAM.    Even with 
techniques such as using globally defined arrays and maximizing the reuse of these 
arrays, the MICAz mote failed to provide enough RAM to implement the complete 
NTRUEncrypt-251 cryptosystem.  The only way to successfully execute NTRUEncrypt-
251 on the MICAz mote was to reduce the value of q to 64, and used polynomial arrays 
with 8-bit coefficients.    
Even with the reduced coefficient widths, the collection of timing data from 
NTRUEncrypt-251 implementation proved to be challenge.   The first attempt executed 
the complete cryptosystem with the Karatsuba and Fpf ⊗+= 1 optimizations disabled.  
This resulted in the MICAz continuously crashing due to lack of memory.  The only 
option remaining was to enable the Fpf ⊗+= 1  substitution, since enabling Karatsuba 
would definitely require more memory.  The Fpf ⊗+= 1  substitution eliminated the 
need to store the inverse fp array, thereby reducing the required RAM by 251 bytes.  This 
small reduction in memory was just enough to capture timing for a 10 round average of 
the complete cryptosystem as shown in Figure 6.5 and summarized in Table 6.4.  
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Figure 6.5: NTRUEncrypt-251 Average Exec Time for 10 Rounds with CutOff = 252 
Due to the selection of q = 64, instead of q = 128, decryption failures occurred as 
indicated by the fact decrypted message c does not equal the original plaintext message 
mx in Figure 6.5.  Figure 6.5 also shows that it took 16 total attempts of finding 
polynomial inverses for fq to obtain 10 successful inverses to complete an end-to-end 
execution of the NTRUEncrypt cryptosystem.  
 
NTRUEncrypt-251 Operation Variable Name Execution Time (ms) 
Initialization  23546 
Private Key Generation f 51 
Temp Key Generation f2 6027 
Secret Key Generation fq 17468 
Encryption Total  3895 
Secret Polynomial Generation g 52 
Blinding Polynomial Generation r 51 
Public Key Generation h 1947 
Encryption e 1845 
Decryption c 2229 
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Table 6.4: NTRUEncrypt-251 Execution Times 
The three highlighted rows were created for comparison to the categories of the ECIES-
160 output in the previous section 6.4.  The execution times for the categories of 
Initialization and Encryption Total is the sum total of the execution times of the indented 
rows below each category.  Since the total encryption time for ECIES-160, shown in 
Table 6.2, includes the public key generation time, the category labeled ‘Encryption 
Total’ in Table 6.4 displays the total time for all steps of the encryption for 
NTRUEncrypt-251. 
Attempts to improve the above executions times by enabling just one round of 
Karatsuba caused the MICAz to continuously reset due to insufficient RAM. 
6.6 NTRUEncyrpt-251 vs. ECIES-160 
Figure 6.6 compares the execution times for all stages of NTRUEncrypt-251 versus 
ECIES-160. 
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Figure 6.6: NTRUEncrypt-251 and ECIES-160 Execution Times 
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The Initialization times between the two cryptosystems revealed NTRUEncrypt-251 took 
approximately 13 times longer to initialize relative to ECIES-160, though the Encryption 
and Decryption times of the two cryptosystem were very comparable.   
6.7 NTRUEncyrpt-107 
Given the poor performance of NTRUEncrypt-251 on the MICAz mote, the ‘low’ 
security version of NTRUEncrypt, specified in Table 6.3, was evaluated to understand 
the effects Karatsuba would have on the overall execution time.  Since NTRUEncrypt-
107 requires less than half of the memory of NTRUEncrypt-251, execution times with all 
optimizations enabled were easily collected without any memory constraint issues.  
Figure 6.8 summarizes the various executions times at selected Karatsuba cutoff values 
with Figure 6.7 showing the details for the fastest execution time when CutOff = 28. 
 
Figure 6.7: NTRUEncrypt-107 Average Exec Times for 10 Rounds with CutOff = 28 
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NTRUEncrypt-107 (Zero Check On Multiply Enabled)
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Figure 6.8: NTRUEncrypt-107 Execution Times with Zero Check Enabled. 
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The execution times for Encryption, Decryption and Public Key generation actually 
increase as more iterations of Karatsuba were introduced, while Initialization times 
decrease.  The reason this occurs is due to less usage of the ‘zero check’ optimization 
within the Star Multiplication, Algorithm 5.1, as CutOff values are decreased.  This very 
simple check for multiplication of zero coefficients is actually quicker than utilizing the 
Karatsuba method that does not include the check.  Figure 6.9 shows the results for the 
execution times when the Zero Check was disabled for increasing levels of Karatsuba. 
The overall time for every cutoff value was worse than when the zero check enabled.  
The fastest execution time was 3921ms with Karatsuba (CutOff = 28) and the zero check 
in Star Multiply enabled compared to 5847ms with Karatsuba (CutOff = 8) and zero 
check disabled.  This simple optimization of checking for zeros saved 1926ms overall. 
 
NTRUEncrypt-107 (Zero Check On Multiply Disabled)
6845
5717
4928 4542 4509
5034
522
420
356
328 336
398
509
399
329
299 300
352
559
449
378
351 358
425
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
108 55 28 15 8 5
CutOff Value
Ti
m
e 
(m
s) Decryption
Encryption
Public Key
Initialization
 
Figure 6.9: NTRUEncrypt-107 Execution Times with Zero Check Disabled. 
Given additional memory on the MICAz, Karatsuba would have reduced the overall 
execution time for NTRUEncrypt-251 based on the execution time improvements 
Karatsuba provide NTRUEncrypt-107. 
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6.8 Energy Consumption 
6.8.1 Microprocessor Power Consumption 
The energy calculation equation presented in Liu et al [17] was used to calculate the 
power consumption used by the MICAz for each cryptosystem. 
 
 W = U x I x t (21) 
 
Where: 
W – Power in millijoules (mJ) 
U – Voltage in volts (v) 
I – Current in milliamps (ma) 
t – Time in milliseconds (ms) 
 
Per the Crossbow data sheet for the MICAz mote, the current draw I = 8ma, at a voltage 
U = 3v [25].  An example calculation using the encryption time for ECIES-160 being 
3907.49 ms, the amount of energy required to execute is: 
 
W = U x I x t 
W = 3v x 8ma x 3907.4ms 
W = 93.8 mJ  
 
 The amount of power required to execute NTRUEncrypt-251 versus ECIES-160 at 
various stages of the algorithms is shown in Table 6.5.   
 
Operation ECIES-160 Power 
Consumption (mJ) 
NTRUEncrypt-251 Power 
Consumption (mJ) 
Initialization 44.1 576.1 
Encryption 93.8 93.5 
Decryption 63.2 53.5 
Table 6.5: Power Consumption for ECIES-160 and NTRUEncrypt-251 
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6.8.2 Transmit and Receive Power 
Power calculations for the transmission and receipt of data, is based on the total number 
of data bits and the power required by the antenna to transmit a single bit.  Power 
consumption of the ZigBee transceiver, CC2420, integrated into the MICAz mote 
consumes the following power to transmit and receive [9]: 
  
Transmit Power @0dBm = 0.209 µJ/bit 
Receive Power = 0.226 µJ/bit 
 
The number of bits used in transmission and receiving, for each cryptosystem, are 
determined by their respective public key sizes in Table 6.6.   
 
Cryptosystem Calculation Public Key Size 
(bits) 
NTRUEncrypt-251 N*log2(q) = 251* log2(128) 1757 
ECIES-160 Num Public Keys * Size of Public Key 
(bits) = 2*160 
320 
Table 6.6: Public Key Size for NTRUEncrypt-251 and ECIES-160 
Multiplication of the public key size by the power to transmit and receive one bit 
produces the transceiver power required to exchange a message on the MICAz mote as 
shown in Table 6.7. 
 
Operation Power (µJ) Cryptosystem 
Transmit Receive 
NTRUEncrypt-251 1757*0.209 = 367.21  1757*0.226 = 397.08 
ECIES-160 320*0.209 = 66.88 320*0.226 = 72.32 
Table 6.7: Transmit and Receive Power Based on Cryptosystem 
Since the power to transmit and receive is based on the number of bits in the public key, 
ECIES-160 requires less power than NTRUEncrypt-251.  
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Overall the execution time required by the cryptosystem to prepare the data to be 
transmitted requires a magnitude of 3 times more power than to transmit and receive the 
data.  Optimization techniques that reduce the amount of execution time required by the 
processor will have the most impact on battery life. 
6.9 Code Size 
Calculation of the nesC code size for ECIES-160 and NTRUEncrypt-251 utilized the 
‘check_size_micaz.pl’ PERL [4] script, under the TinyOS distribution, to obtain RAM 
and ROM sizes [17].  The script displays the code’s RAM and ROM size for each class 
referenced in the final binary executable file.  Executing the script on the ECIES-160 and 
NTRUEncrypt-251 code obtained the outputs shown in Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11 
respectively. 
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Figure 6.10: ECIES-160 Code Size 
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Figure 6.11: NTRUEncrypt-251 Code Size 
The script isolates each individual class and displays that class’s code size (ROM) and 
bss (RAM) sizes in two columns.  The ROM calculation is the amount of program flash 
memory required to store the program code, including the initial values of global 
variables, within the MICAz’s max limit of 128KB of ROM.  The RAM calculation, also 
known as data, contains the size for constants and initialized static data.  Combining the 
values of each row for each column produces the ‘Totals’ value in the last line of Figure 
6.10 and Figure 6.11.  To obtain code sizes for each cryptosystem, only the entries related 
to the actual cryptosystem code are combined where as the other entries for the MICAz’s 
operating system are ignored.  The NTRUEncrypt-251 was written in one nesC file, so 
the only entry needed from Figure 6.11 for the ROM and RAM sizes is the ‘NtruC’ entry.  
Code size for the ECIES-160 implementation uses many nesC classes, all of which need 
to be added together.  Adding the ROM and RAM sizes together for ECCM, ECIESM, 
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NNM, RandomLFSR, SHA1M, testECIESM and secp160r1 produced the ROM and 
RAM sizes for ECIES-160 in Table 6.8. 
 
Cryptosystem ROM (bytes) RAM (bytes) 
NTRUEncrypt-251 2214 0 
ECIES-160 18136 2156 
Table 6.8: NTRUEncrypt-251 and ECIES-160 ROM and RAM Sizes 
The memory sizes published by Liu et al [17] were 19308 bytes for ROM and 1510 bytes 
for RAM.  The memory size differences between Liu et al [17] and this thesis’s work 
may be related to different classes being chosen in the total memory size calculations. 
  The RAM size of ‘0’ in the NTRUEncrypt calculation indicates no constants or 
static data were used in the implementation.  Overall, NTRUEncrypt-251 occupies less 
ROM and RAM than ECIES-160. 
7 Conclusion and Future Work 
The work presented in this thesis provided the design, implementation and evaluation of 
NTRUEncrypt on a resource constrained device.  An overview of ECC provided a high 
level understanding of the PKCS.  Performance characteristic including execution time, 
power consumption and code size for both NTRUEncrypt-251 and ECIES-160 were 
evaluated.  The performance impacts of several optimizations to NTRUEncrypt were 
presented along with there tradeoffs. 
 Though NTRUEncrypt-251 was not able to outperform ECIES-160 due to system 
resource constraints, results suggest better performance of NTRUEncrypt-251 may be 
obtainable if more memory was available.   
Opportunities exist that can significantly improve the performance of 
NTRUEncrypt on resource constrained devices.  This thesis proved that Karatsuba can 
provide significant reductions in the overall execution time of the NTRUEncrypt, 
especially in the calculation of polynomial inverses.  This thesis was unable to provide an 
optimized NTRUEncrypt-251 implement that could outperform ECIES-160 due to the 
4kB memory constraint of the MICAz mote.  Given several kB more memory, 
NTRUEncrypt-251 has the potential to outperform ECIES-160.   
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Future work of implementing NTRUEncrypt-251 on a Crossbow TelosB mote, 
which contains 10kB of RAM, should allow the enablement of optimizations that may 
bring NTRUEncrypt-251 performance equal to or better than ECIES-160. 
The addition of a ‘Zero Check’ in the Karatsuba algorithm may enhance overall 
execution time of NTRUEncrypt similar to the results of the ‘Zero Check’ in the Star 
Multiply algorithm.  
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